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Abstract
The convention signed with the French authorities for the LHC defines a new
Installation Nucléaire de Base (INB). The LHC machine tunnel, the experiments,
some buildings which cover access shafts to the machine and the SPS with its
extraction lines up to the targets are all inside the new perimeter. The new
convention came into effect in September 2000 and therefore the SPS fell within
the new context from that time. As a consequence, SL has to operate the SPS
within this new regulatory framework and a small working group was set up to
look at the requirements and to estimate the resources required. The conclusions of
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11 Executive Summary
Having the SPS and LHC classified as "Installations Nucléaires de Base" (INB) under French
law imposes a certain number of constraints on CERN. Firstly there are some procedures
which have to be implemented in the fields of safety, traceability, zonage of the installations
and waste management practices, and secondly documents describing safety and operational
procedures have to be submitted and approved by the French authorities before operation can
commence. The INBOPS working group was set up to outline a strategy for operating the
SPS within the INB framework and to quantify the resources.
This report presents the conclusions of the working group and is intended as a guide to
management for the resource planning in the immediate future. The report covers the four
main areas of activity which are associated with operating within the INB framework:
documentation, zoning, traceability and waste management. This is not a design study; the
aim was to suggest a reasonable minimum operational scenario and to estimate the resources
for its implementation. In a next step the detailed design will have to be made and at that time
the resources can be more accurately determined. The resources stated here should be
regarded as a good first approximation to what will be required.
The total manpower for implementation of the project has been estimated and some
indication of what might be available from existing resources is indicated. There is clearly
insufficient manpower available in CERN at present and it is not clear that the missing
resources can be outsourced. However a global estimate for replacing missing in house
resources by outsourcing is included in the values below.
1.1 Documentation
The SPS has become an INB under the convention signed for the LHC. Most of the
documentation that is required will cover all installations mentioned in the convention,
namely the SPS and its extraction lines up to the targets, the CNGS beam line (internally this
will be included up to the hadron stop which is in Switzerland and therefore not technically
part of the INB), the LHC and its transfer lines. A schedule for the delivery of documents to
the French authorities has been established and the majority of the documents have to be
submitted for mid 2003 in order to obtain approval for the sector test in April 2004 with
injection the of beam in October 2004. A complete waste management document covering all
of CERN’s activities has to be prepared for submission in mid-2004.
It is estimated that 1 FTE (Full Time Equivalent) will be required continuously over the next
three years to cover the editorial effort for this. During the period of preparation of these
documents substantial secretarial support will be required in the INB liaison office (>0.5 FTE
on these activities). From 2004 on, about 0.1 FTE will be required continuously for editing
the quarterly and annual reports which have to be sent to the French authorities together with
a secretarial support >0.2 FTE.
Much of the technical content for the documents has to be prepared by the experts in the
equipment and support groups. On average each equipment group will have to devote about
two man-months to this effort, meaning a total of about 2 man-years. Some groups however,
like SL-MR, TIS-GS and TIS-RP will have to devote far greater resources (totalling around
1.5 man-years spread over 3 years) because they will have to define strategies and
procedures.
2The financial costs (printing, travel etc.) which total around 15 kCHF per annum, are
assumed to be a negligible part of the various group’s travel and exploitation  budgets.
1.2 Zonage
A simplistic operational zonage was implemented for the SPS for the 2000-2001 shutdown –
everywhere in the horizontal underground areas was classified as a nuclear zone. The major
disadvantage of this was that all waste coming from the SPS automatically became classified
as nuclear waste, even if it was not radioactive. Since it is not possible to de-classify waste
under French regulations, it will cost a significant sum to dispose of it. If a definitive zonage
can be established, it should afford significant financial savings in the long term. To produce
such a scheme will require effort from highly skilled scientific and technical staff.
The manpower required during the initial period totals approximately 10 man-years and these
resources are currently not available. For the continuing effort, a further 1.8 FTE are required
in addition to the existing staff.
The new hardware for the RP group will cost around 130 kCHF and there will be annual
maintenance costs. The additional beam instrumentation for the SPS cannot be specified at
this time and will have to be added at a later date once the design study has been completed.
1.3 Traceability
Traceability of materials coming out of an INB is one of the primary requirements from the
French authorities. The reason for having traceability is to be able to understand and identify
anomalies and in this instance the typical anomaly is the discovery of a radioactive substance
in something which was thought to be conventional. The conventional equipment is therefore
as important as the radioactive material to trace.
The traceability system introduced in the SPS for the 2000 - 2001 shutdown was a temporary
solution which minimised resources and met the minimum requirements. This system will
become unmanageable very soon – the volume of data is already significant and it is in the
form of paper records. If it was necessary to trace an anomaly now it would involve a huge
amount of work sorting through this stack of papers. The plan is to manually introduce this
information in the computer and once this has been done, a simple database query will return
the complete information. The long term solution is therefore to have a fully computerised
system which will provide something which is much easier to maintain and much more
flexible to operate.
In order to design and implement a traceability system for the SPS some 6 man-years of
manpower should be backed up with about 1.4 MCHF. This work will cover the mechanical
design and implementation of buffer zones equipped with self-service traceability stations at
each of the 12 access points. At the same time there will be database design and
implementation, data collection, software design and implementation for the user interfaces
and finally design and implementation of the software required to interface the barcode
readers and to produce other functionality like printing of barcodes. Maintenance and
operation of the system will require 1.5 FTE at engineer level and 5 FTE technicians.
Hardware and operating costs are estimated to be around 100 kCHF per annum. It is not
possible to estimate the cost of infrastructure changes in laboratories and workshops, this will
have to be done at the design stage but it is clear that the manpower in the equipment groups
3required for operating and maintaining traceability will be at about the level of one man-
month per annum and per equipment group. There are about 20 equipment groups concerned
by these activities of which about 10 will be heavily involved in traceability activities.
1.4 Waste Management
Waste management at CERN is being studied as a global project and the SPS INB is just one
aspect of it. The cost of implementing this system is not evaluated in this report but some
specific activities are required to operate the SPS in the INB framework before this study is
completed in 2004. The motivation for a maximum effort in this direction is the cost of
disposal: for well documented (inventory of radionuclides), compacted, low activity waste
the minimum current cost for disposal is around 30 kCHF / m3.
Nuclear waste should be minimised at all stages in the life cycle – design, operation and
processing for disposal. Use of certain materials should be avoided if possible because they
are likely to generate higher levels of radioactive waste. The list of such materials should be
established and design of new equipment should be verified in this respect. Operation of the
accelerator should be optimised so as to minimise activation and finally waste should be
processed to separate the radioactive and non-radioactive parts and to minimise the volume.
The chemical composition of the existing nuclear waste from SPS has to be identified and
procedures for the provision of this information concerning future waste also have to be put
in place. The provision of this information should be included in the shutdown planning.
Conventional waste from the surface buildings of the SPS which are inside the INB perimeter
should be disposed of through agreed channels and a trace maintained. This will require the
implementation of a new infrastructure and a new contract for disposal to be established.
In order to put these systems in place for the SPS it will cost around 200 kCHF and consume
1.5 man years. The on-going costs for operation and maintenance will be around 2.5 FTE and
30 kCHF per annum.
1.5 General Infrastructure
The weigh bridge and gate monitor purchased for LEP Dismantling will continue to be used
and will therefore consume resources and require maintenance. One person will have to be
available all of the time to operate the weigh bridge and a radiation protection technician
should also be available from time to time. Thus one FTE is required and this could be
outsourced.
The database has to be modified to integrate specifications for all of the equipment to be
found within the nuclear zones. This information is required for disposal but details of the
location(s) of equipment in the tunnel is also important for traceability. This work will
require around 4 man-months of effort at the database end and an average of about one man-
month in each of the 20 equipment groups.
More detailed planning, accounting for waste management (specification of materials, storage
etc.) will have to be established. This will add about 2 man-months of effort to the current
planning activities for the SPS shutdowns.
4Quality assurance affects activities across the operation of the INB and people in the
equipment groups and others concerned with operation will have to define procedures and
work with the quality unit to establish the plan. This will require about 1 man-month per
group (totalling around 2 man-years) initially and a continuing equivalent amount to follow
the execution of the procedures and maintain them.
Improved security for the SPS sites is envisaged with a minimum level being one dedicated
24 hour mobile surveillance team. In addition, the perimeter fences on the SPS sites will
require improvements. The cost for security activities will be around 850 kCHF per annum
and a one-off cost of around 200 kCHF for site improvements and then annual maintenance.
During LEP dismantling it was necessary to employ additional personnel for the management
of the storage facilities. This will probably be needed again during the shutdown periods,
corresponding to an additional outsourcing of around 1 man-year/year plus maintenance
costs.
1.6 Summary of Resources:














Documentation 8.0 8.0 0.3 0.3
Zonage 130 10.0 1.5 25 1.8 1.8
Traceability 1400 6.0 6.0 100 6.5 2.0 4.0
Waste 200 1.5 0 30 2.0 2.0
Weigh bridge 0 25 1.0 1.0
Database 2.0 0 0
QA 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Security 200 0 25 10.0 0 10.0
Storage areas 0 50 1.0 0 1.0
Total 1900 29.5 17.5 255 24.1 6.3 17.8
It can be seen that in the initial period and investment of around 2 MCHF would be required
and that there is a shortfall in the human resources available. It is not clear that this shortfall
can be outsourced because of the particular expertise required but if it was, then it would cost
around 1.5 MCHF (12 man-years at engineer level). During the operational phase the
material costs are modest but there is a large commitment of human resources with an
outsourced 18 FTE which would cost around 2 MCHF per year.
It is therefore the conclusion of the working group that an initial investment of between 2 and
3.5 MCHF, with some 12 man-years of effort currently not identified from CERN’s
resources, and running costs of around 2 MCHF per annum will be required for operation of
the SPS in the INB context.
1.7 Recommendation
A project should be initiated to define and implement the necessary measures for operation of
the SPS within the INB framework and sufficient resources should be allocated.
52 Background Information
The signature of the convention with the French authorities for the LHC created a new
Installation Nucléaire de Base (INB). The LHC machine tunnel, the experiments, some
buildings which cover access shafts to the machine and the SPS with its extraction lines up to
the targets (including the CNGS beam line) are all within the perimeter which is defined by
this document. The new convention came into effect in the year 2000 and therefore the SPS
fell within the new context from that time. CERN therefore has to operate the SPS within this
framework and a small working group was set up to look at the resources required.
The working group called INBOPS (for INB OPerations of SPS) was formed from
representatives of the various groups directly involved and the LHC experiments were invited
to send delegates so that they might prepare for the LHC INB in a few years time (see
membership list in the Appendix). The aim of the working group was to propose a working
scenario for the SPS as a possible prototype for the LHC, to estimate the resources which will
be required and to indicate the timescale for implementation.
The report covers the four main areas of activity which are associated with operating within
the INB framework: documentation, zoning, traceability and waste management. The
proposals presented here are not the result of a design study; the aim was to suggest a




The work which is considered here only concerns the preparation of documents for the
SPS/CNGS (LHC is not included). Furthermore, it only evaluates the resources for a few of
the studies which will have to be done in order to produce the necessary data. The “Étude
Rejets et Effluents” for SPS/CNGS, quoted in the “zonage” section is accounted for. The
“Compléments sur le Fonctionnement de l’ensemble SPS/CNGS” which will also have to be
included in the “Rapport Préliminaire de Sûreté du LHC” is not accounted for. The latter
report has to be finished by mid 2002 in order to be presented to the “Groupe Permanent
Labos et Usines” before it can be incorporated in the “Rapport Provisoire de Sûreté du LHC”
the latter will be needed by mid 2003 to get the authorisation for sector test in spring 2004.
The production of the documentation required for the operation of an INB represents a heavy
work load and in this chapter the process is reviewed and the resources discussed.
3.2 Reports
The French authorities have laid down a minimum set of regulations concerning nuclear
installations and in general it is up to the operator, CERN in our case, to clearly document
various aspects of his activities. In this documentation the operator defines his goals,
strategies and procedures. The documents are then examined by the authorities and once they
have been approved the operator is given permission to start operations accordingly.
Throughout the life cycle of the installation further documentation and regular reports are
required for the authorities to assess the results of the chosen strategies and for the operator to
refine or propose new goals, strategies or procedures.
For the INB the main documents which have to be produced are listed in the Appendix
(section 8.5), together with the schedule for publication as agreed with the DSIN in
November 2000. These documents have to be assembled from various contributions, edited
and submitted to the authorities in a timely manner.
In the near future three main reports have to be prepared for the SPS:
 ‘Étude des Rejets et Effluents’(mid 2002): this study of emissions and effluents
concerns the whole of the new INB but since the SPS, CNGS and LHC all operate with
proton beams of high intensities and high energies, most of the work that needs to be done
in the short term for the SPS can be reused for the other two facilities.
 ‘Gestion des Déchets’ (early 2004): this study concerns the waste management for the
whole of the new INB. Note that since the CNGS and LHC installations are completely
new, the SPS will be the major producer of waste, in volume and tonnage, in the near
future.
 ‘Rapport Provisoire de Sûreté’(mid 2003): this Provisional Safety Report contains two
main sections (Safety and Risk Analysis and General Operating Procedures). Once
discussed and approved this will turn into a Final Safety Report.
7The scope of these reports is clearly the whole of the new INB, but we estimate that about
two-thirds of the effort of writing these documents is directly or indirectly linked to the fact
that the SPS is included in the perimeter of the new INB.
The production of these documents obviously requires many experts and engineers to write
the chapters concerned with their particular domain under a central editorial guidance. A
constant secretarial support is also required in the preparation of the documents and in the
organisation of the various activities associated with liaison with the French authorities.
While it is possible to estimate the resources necessary for the central editorial team and the
secretarial support, it is difficult to estimate those associated with the work of the experts and
engineers in the fields of safety, radiation protection, quality assurance, operations,
equipment groups and so on. Based on the LEP Dismantling experience this will correspond
to about 4 man-years and will have to come from resources within CERN.
3.3 Visits and Inspections
Another time consuming activity is centred around the visits of the French authorities for all
machines in the INB perimeter (LEP, LHC, SPS, CNGS). These visits may be official visits
like inspections, informal visits like technical exchanges and discussions (typically IPSN
representatives visiting CERN or vice versa), or meetings to defend a document.
While the visits themselves represent only a few days each time, the preparation and follow-
up take a significant amount of time for the people directly involved, typically 6 to 8, not
including the many experts and engineers from several divisions who are consulted in this
process. It is difficult to estimate this workload and to a large extent these activities are not
considered in the present analysis.
3.4 Resources
From the above considerations, and based on the experience gained with the LEP
Dismantling project, the necessary resources for the documentation activities have been




over the next 3 years)
Continuing Effort
(per annum)
Editing of the main reports 1 my 0.1 my
Secretariat for main reports, visits
and relations with authorities 0.6 my 0.2 my
The above estimate only concerns the central role of the editors and a much more effort has
to come from the various experts who are regularly consulted and asked to write up their
contributions to the main reports. This additional effort is estimated to be of the order of




This chapter estimates the workload which will be required to define the zonage (zoning) of
the SPS, including CNGS. The study will require theoretical estimates (mostly Monte Carlo
simulations) confirmed by experimental measurements and complemented by an assessment
of past operational history of the machine. The zonage study will have close links with:
1) the traceability system: the LEP experience has shown that the zonage is a 3-D problem;
the material removed from the tunnel will have to be traced according to its position in the
tunnel and its classification;
2) the waste management: the studies for the zonage can possibly provide (part of) the
information on radionuclide inventories present in the waste generated from the SPS,
which is needed for its final disposal. It will also help with the planning of waste
production and provide feedback for minimisation of waste;
3) machine operation and data logging.
The aim of the zonage study will be to classify the various regions of the machine tunnel,
access tunnels and auxiliary buildings in “zones à déchets conventionels” (conventional
waste), “zones à déchets TFA” (very low activity waste), “zones à déchets FA” (low activity
waste), “zones à déchets MA” (medium activity waste) and “zones à déchets HA” (high
activity waste). The French legislation does not provide clear indication for the classification
of material in either category according to the induced radioactivity.
The long term goals of the zonage study are:
1) easy maintenance and interaction with other activities (such as traceability report writing
for INB) in order to minimise resources needed in the long-term;
2) minimise the amount of nuclear waste and materials, especially TFA waste.
4.2 The LEP Experience
As a starting point it is useful to review the experience gained with LEP. The LEP zonage
was performed with limited additional manpower and resources, exploiting previous studies
carried out during LEP operation. These studies provided information on radiation sources,
essentially from synchrotron radiation measurements as well as measurements performed on
the superconducting cavities. The definition of the LEP zonage involved the following:
1. calculations - both analytical and Monte Carlo;
2. dedicated measurements of irradiated samples or samples taken from material and
equipment installed in LEP;
3. setting-up of dedicated monitoring electronics and software at the LEP dump, to monitor
the number of leptons dumped so that the measurements mentioned above could be
normalised;
4. detailed radiation surveys in addition to the routine ring surveys carried out at the
beginning of long shutdowns;
5. a detailed analysis of the history of the 11-year operation of LEP;
6. write-up of 14 reports summarising the results of calculations and measurement;
97. a consistent contribution to the write-up of the various official reports transmitted to
DSIN and IPSN for the dismantling authorisation.
The LEP zonage study lasted about 2 years and required a total of about 5 man-years of
scientific staff and 2 man-years of technical staff. These figures do not include the work done
for the zonage of the four experiments.
4.3 Zonage Study for SPS
The SPS presents particular differences with respect to LEP: apart from the CNGS areas
which are “virgin”, the SPS has been in operation for almost thirty years both as an
accelerator and a collider. Equipment may have been installed for a number of years in a
certain zone of the machine, then removed, stored for months or years, and possibly re-
installed in a different zone. Areas to be considered in the zonage study of SPS are:
- the SPS ring,
- the transfer tunnels up to the targets,
- the access tunnels linking the machine and transfer tunnels with the access shafts,
- the access shafts linking the surface buildings with the underground areas,
- the BA buildings (some of which contain the ion-exchangers where radioactive water
circulates),
- the ventilation buildings (the ventilation filters may be active because of radon and its
daughters),
- the pits draining water from the transfer tunnels,
- the berm on top of TCC 2,
- the CNGS areas.
Overviews of the various areas (SPS, targets stations and CNGS) are shown in Figures 1-2.
The zonage study will require calculations and measurements of the hadron fluence around
the SPS and subsequent extrapolation to the adjacent areas such as service and access tunnels,
shafts, etc. A relationship will have to be established between proton losses and hadron
fluence at the various locations around the accelerator for a number of representative
situations and operating conditions. The zonage will necessarily have to be, at least partially,
based on the past radiological history of the SPS, i.e. the results of past measurements and
radiation surveys, as well as beam loss scenarios.
For any given area, the computational effort will be proportional to the dimension and
“complication” (in terms of geometry) of the area. The zonage will most likely be a function
of distance from the beam axis. Thus the machine and transfer tunnels may or may not
require a sub-zonage to separate the accelerator and beam line components from cable and
cable-trays running on the tunnel walls, as well as the walls themselves. Most of the
calculation effort will probably be required for the classification of access tunnels and shafts.
The calculations will have to be confirmed by gamma-spectrometry measurements on
samples taken from the various areas.
It is considered that the best approach is to establish a well-defined initial zonage, which will
require a substantial amount of work (“prior” effort) and subsequently to update it annually
with a relatively minor effort, i.e. as far as we can a “low maintenance” work (“continuing”
effort).
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To obtain a first idea on where the limit between conventional areas and TFA areas may be
located around the SPS, radiation surveys were carried out in the access shafts and access
tunnels (TAs) at all BAs. Being in a shutdown period, these measurements were influenced
by the background created by radioactive material temporarily stored in some of the TA
tunnels, in addition to the background coming from the machine tunnel generated by
activated SPS components. These surveys have been complemented by gamma spectrometry
measurements performed on concrete samples collected in all TAs. The measurements have
shown negligible values of induced radioactivity in most samples, with the exception of
samples taken in TA2, TA6 and TA7. These samples showed traces of one or more of the
following radionuclides: 22Na, 54Mn, 60Co, 152Eu and 154Eu, with a maximum of 0.5 Bq/g of
152Eu in one sample from TA7. These surveys and measurements indicate that the limit
between conventional and TFA material will most likely be located either at the interface
between the shaft and the TA tunnel or somewhere in the TA tunnel.
For a few areas it is worth making specific comments:
TT10
The upstream part of TT10 will be excluded from the zonage, as in this area activation can
only be produced by beam losses in TT2, i.e. losses due to operation of the PS which is not
under SPS control. A precise limit which corresponds to a physical barrier in the tunnel will
have to be defined.
TCC2
The downstream end of the target hall is geographically delimited by physical barriers (gates)
separating it from the transfer tunnels TT81, TT82 and TT83. From a traceability point-of-
view, all TCC2 is included in the INB perimeter, as it will be impossible to distinguish
between material coming from the areas upstream and downstream of the targets. The same
approach is recommended for the zonage.
TCC6
The same approach applies to TCC6, which is physically separated from the downstream
tunnel TT61 by a gate.
4.4 Type of Activities
The zonage study will require the following activities:
HISTORY: mostly a prior effort to find out the history of the different zones. This will
represent a large workload but it can be spread over a certain period consistent with the
document delivery schedule.
CALCULATIONS: mostly a prior effort, to establish the activation in different
materials/elements for a given loss pattern and for the different zones. There will then be
some continuing effort (but not much), mostly when operating conditions change drastically.
Some of these calculations involve environmental aspects (air and water releases). Whether
the known MA/HA zones should be also subject to calculations is debatable.
MEASUREMENTS: a prior effort to do detailed spectrometry, dose rate and contamination
measurements on samples taken from the different zones. This will be required to justify any
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conventional or TFA (vs. FA, MA or HA) zoning. Continuing measurements should be done
should the operating conditions change drastically for confirmation of the revised zonage.
INSTRUMENTATION: definition of additional instrumentation needed in the tunnel or
service areas. A prior effort mostly, to be revised regularly (continuing effort) if operating
conditions change drastically.
LOGGING/MONITORING of the beam parameters (intensity, losses, energy, etc.), mostly a
continuing effort. Someone will have to be responsible for the monitoring of the logging
processes and ensuring that everything is properly documented. Particular effort will be
needed to document the changes made to the different zones during technical stops and
shutdowns, including linking with the traceability database to ensure that the proper route is
chosen. The implementation of the logging, given the instrumentation is a prior effort.
SURVEY of the induced radioactivity, either with active instrumentation or passive
dosimetry. Regular ring surveys at beginning of shutdown fall in this category. It is clearly a
continuing activity.
DOCUMENTATION or making sure that all the above information are tracked in a
consistent and centralised way. It is clearly a continuing effort which will ease the reporting
to DSIN/IPSN. Another part of this is a study of improvements in operating conditions and
protections to minimise the amount of waste produced; this is also a continuing effort which
is part of the waste study. This might include suggesting additional shielding/doors to better
define the zones where active waste is produced, changes or additions to instrumentation to
better control a specific loss pattern, etc.









4.5 Breakdown of Work and Resources Required
Tables 1-3 in Section 8.3 of the Appendix provide estimates of what will be required to
define the classification for each area in terms of zonage.
The requirements in terms of documentation are not specifically mentioned because this item
clearly applies to all activities.
Based on the estimate of the work needed, the manpower requirements for the various
activity and areas of the SPS and CNGS are listed in Tables 4-7 (Section 8.3).
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It should be noted that there is no continuing effort required in terms of calculations, both for
SPS and CNGS, once the initial picture has been established. However, any change of
operation conditions or abnormal operation will require some additional calculations. This
potential effort cannot be foreseen at present.
In addition to the specific requirements listed in Tables 7-10, some very generic calculations
and measurements are deemed necessary:
Generic calculations
For the SPS tunnel, generic calculations will be required for a standard complete machine
period, valid for all tunnel sectors, at the injection energy and at the maximum energy. These
calculations will evaluate the activation pattern as a function of beam loss pattern. The
estimated time is 6 man-months.
Etude de rejets for SPS.
Separate studies will be needed for air and cooling water releases (étude de rejets) from
points 1, 2, 4 and 6. The estimated time is 2-3 man-months for each area, i.e. a total of 8-12
man-months.
TCC2 and TCC6 will both require 4 man-months for a total of 8 man-months. The dumps in
TT20, TT40 and TT60 will require 1 man-month each for a total of 3 man-months. The re-
calculation of ground-water activation around TCC2 (this study is coupled with the study of
air and cooling water releases) will require 4 man-months.
Generic gamma-spectrometry measurements
Gamma-spectrometry measurements on reference samples irradiated at specific locations
around the SPS will serve two purposes:
1. to link beam losses to specific activity induced in the various materials present in the
tunnel, similar to what was done for LEP
2. to help in establishing a radionuclide inventory needed for final disposal of radioactive
waste.
In principle these measurements will be done only once and will require 4 man-months.
They may need to be repeated if the operation conditions change drastically or if new
materials are introduced in the machine tunnel.
4.6 Summary of Manpower Requirements
The global manpower requirements for the zonage of SPS and CNGS (covering the generic
studies and measurements and the area specific work) can be summarised as follows:
SPS Prior: 103 man-months of scientific staff (91 man-months TIS/RP, 12
man-months SL)
Continuing: 7 man-months of high-level technical staff (4 man-months
TIS/RP, 3 man-months SL)
This manpower has to be added to the present 18 man-months
of TIS/RP technical staff dedicated to the SPS areas.
CNGS Prior: 10 man-months (6 man-months technical staff, 4 man-month
scientific staff, all with TIS/RP)
Continuing: 12 man-months (high-level technical staff in TIS/RP)
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For the sake of completeness, it should be underlined that the
effort currently under way (until December 2001) already
amounts to 36 man-months.
The above figure of manpower needs for the “prior” effort for SPS (103 man-months)
compares well with the time spent for the LEP zonage (approximately 7 man-years, i.e. 84
man-months).
In terms of planning, the “prior” effort of the zonage study for SPS and CNGS will
approximately require 3 TIS/RP scientific staff for 2.5 years, 1 SL scientific staff for 1 year
and 1 high-level TIS/RP technical staff for 1.5 years. This manpower is on top of the present
staff available. The “continuing” effort will require, in addition to the present staff, 1.5 high-
level TIS/RP technical staff and 0.3 high-level SL technical staff.
4.7 Infrastructure and Instrumentation Required
For the computational activities a few desktop computers will be needed and the cost will be
of the order of 10 kCHF.
For the gamma-spectrometry measurements a dedicated Ge-spectrometer will probably be
needed; the overall cost of the detectors, lead shielding, electronics and software is of the
order of 120 kCHF. Maintenance of RP equipment will cost around 25 kCHF per annum.
The cost of additional instrumentation for the SPS cannot be estimated at present, but it will
have to be addressed by the working group which will carry out the zonage study.
Finally, it should be pointed out that additional effort will be needed to review or define
issues such as position of interlocked gates and operational dosimetry. This effort, which is
difficult to estimate at present, will have to be shared amongst the SL, TIS and ST Division.
It might also be worth investigating an alternative high-level dosimetry approach, for
example resorting to colour tape dosimetry as used in the past. This or a similar system may
complement the beam loss monitoring system. In turn, the beam loss monitors may
complement the RP induced activity monitoring system. Some of the installed induced
activity monitors and beam loss monitors could be designated as “INB monitors” and be used
to prove whether or not there have been losses in a certain area of the machine over a given





For a future long-term SPS traceability system, the following problems were addressed:
 identification of equipment,
 data management,
 recording the traces - underground equipment and surface waste,
 tracing equipment during repairs and modifications,
 integration with RP systems,
 storage specifications for managed buildings (ISR, 879 etc.) and labs/workshops
5.2 Current Implementation of SPS Traceability
Given the fact that the SPS became classified as an INB on 11 July 2000, with the signature
of the Convention between CERN and the French authorities, an intermediate SPS
traceability system was put in place just in time for the SPS shutdown 2000-2001.  This
intermediate traceability is fully paper-based without computerised support.  As such, the
traceability system depends heavily on the participation and good will of the intervening
parties (equipment groups, TIS/RP and SL/MR).  It is recognised that the current
implementation slows down the evacuation of equipment and the overall shutdown work.
Given the experience that is being gained with the LEP dismantling traceability system, it is
clear that a more flexible and maintainable traceability system for SPS will have to be
computerised and built around a central database for proper data management.
5.3 Comparison between LEP and SPS
The obvious question is "Why not apply the LEP solution for SPS?".  In order to answer this
question, we must outline the differences between the INB traceability needed for LEP and
for SPS.  The major point is that LEP is being fully dismantled and 30000 tons of material are
coming out of the LEP INB perimeter.  This is clearly not the case for SPS despite the fact
that the shutdown 2000-2001 is a major undertaking.  For LEP, the establishment of a
complete inventory of all LEP underground equipment started the database work.  The
identification and the quest for all necessary information on more than 40000 objects, proved
to be a nightmare. The data were scattered, imprecise, insufficient and out of date.  Moreover,
the data collected only covered well-known equipment and it was understood that bulk
material such as cables and pipe-work could not be identified in advance.
The numbers in the following table are estimates of resources deployed for putting the LEP
traceability system in place. These numbers are only rough estimates due to the fact that
several details are dispersed in the dismantling project budget; also, the use of normal CERN
services is not taken into account.  Note that a result-oriented contract is the major resource
for the execution phase of the LEP dismantling traceability.
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LEP Traceability Prior Resources Execution Resources
Software Development 24 man-months
(engineer)
Hardware Installation 250 kCHF
(readers, printers,
computers,…)
Traceability Execution 1 MCHF
(result-oriented
contract)
Traceability Follow-up 24 man-months
(engineer)
5.4 Future SPS Traceability
In order to estimate the necessary resources for the future SPS traceability, a new concept
needs to be outlined for the implementation of this system. The intention is not here to
specify a detailed final solution, but rather to outline certain basic choices.
As mentioned above, the system will depend on a centralised database.  The term object will
be used to refer to a piece of equipment of the SPS in the most general sense and could be
anything from a magnet assembly to radioactive waste bin.  Four major areas of interest are
defined:
1. identification of the object
2. necessary attributes of the objects
3. establishing the trace of the object
4. temporary storage of the object
Within each group concerned, some resources will have to be devoted to traceability
activities. Groups having equipment in the SPS INB are:
 EST – SU
 LHC – ACR,VAC
 SL – BI, BT, CO, EA, HRF, MR, MS, PO
 ST – AA, CV, EL
 TIS – FB, GS, RP
5.5 Object Identification
The objects concerned are all equipment within the SPS underground perimeter i.e. SPS ring,
TT10, extraction lines up to target zones and the CNGS.  A physical barrier, such as a gate or
a door, always defines the limit of the perimeter.  In the case of the TT20 target area for
example, the perimeter extends beyond the targets to the next physical barrier (PPX81 and
PPX82).  For all zones, the limits must be unambiguously defined (e.g. for the transfer lines
TT10 and TT70).  The normal access points to these areas are:
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Access Point Zones in the perimeter
BA1 LSS1, TS1+, TS1-, TT10
BA2 LSS2, TS2+, TS2-, TT20
BA3 LSS3, TS3+, TS3-
BA4 LSS4, TS4+, TS4-
BA5 LSS5, TS5+, TS5-
BA6 LSS6, TS6+, TS6-, TT60
BA7 TNC
BA80 TCC2, TDC2
ECA4 ECX4, TT40, TA40, TI8
ECA5 ECX5
BDW TCC6, TT60, TI2, TT70
PMI2 TI2
Note however, that all Access Points allow access to the complete underground perimeter.
In order to keep track of equipment it is not necessary to identify all objects concerned in the
traceability database - identification could be limited to the objects leaving the perimeter.
However, we should also consider the case of objects that change place within the perimeter
because of the zoning issue.
The working group considers that tools should not be considered as objects that need to be
identified.  The definition of tools in this context is material which does not reside within the
nuclear zones during operation with beam of the SPS.  The working group assumes that there
is no risk of radioactivation outside the period of beam operation.  This assumption needs to
be confirmed by the zoning and related radiological work.  If the risk of contamination exists,
additional measurement equipment must also be considered.
The identifier of the object should be unique.  The name of the installed object cannot be used
as identifier since the object's name might change over time.  A unique traceability identifier
that is created at the time of the evacuation or movement of the object is recommended.  In
the temporary system, such an identifier is already present in the alphanumeric format
'S123456' as well as the corresponding barcode which is also reproduced on the sticker.  The
location of the barcode sticker on the object is important for later processing and storage.
5.6 Object Attributes




Owner (i.e. responsible person within CERN)
Type Attributes Dimensions, weight, conditioning, number
Chemical composition, radionuclide inventory





Changes: name, owner, (dis-)assembly
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5.7 Establishing the Trace
Traceability requirements will inevitably mean additional work for the groups responsible for
equipment within the INB perimeter.  It is difficult to estimate this additional workload which
varies from group to group as a function of the amount of equipment installed and the
frequency of its movement.  For this reason and in the light of diminishing human resources,
the modus operandi of the traceability system interface must be standard, easy to use, flexible
within a rigid scope, manageable, maintainable and beneficial for the overall organisation of
SPS equipment follow-up.
Taking into account that over 90% of the evacuation of objects takes place during the annual
shutdown, the effort should clearly be targeted to optimise the shutdown traceability.
Nevertheless, the system proposed should also cater for unplanned one-off interventions.
The working group proposes the development of a standardised (web-based) interface, that
captures in a user-friendly way all information needed about an object and stores this
information in the central database.  This interface must have query capabilities to retrieve
stored information.  Two levels of information have already been outlined: the type of the
object and the specific object itself.
For the shutdown work, which is carefully planned, each equipment group could introduce
the information necessary in advance through this interface and consequently prepare the
group's shutdown work very precisely.  Even for unplanned piquet interventions, the
information about the object type could be prepared.
The information introduced during this preparation phase must be completed with the actual
evacuation of the object during the execution phase.  Therefore, the same interface must be
available at each of the "Access Points" or "Exit Points" to give a more appropriate name.
This would require a kind of kiosk installation with access to the central database, barcode
reading capability and a distribution mechanism for barcode stickers.
The software developments for the system would have to cover the database and the
associated interfaces and the software for barcode reader functionality. For LEP Dismantling
the traceability system also produces transfer slips for the distribution of materials and similar
extensions of the system functionality will be required for the SPS. The software
development is therefore not simply a matter of building a database and having a couple of
interfaces, it requires a sophisticated integration of several technologies implemented in a
distributed system.
5.8 Buffer Zone and Storage Area
Before leaving the SPS INB perimeter, the requirements for traceability, radiological
verification and storage need to be fulfilled.  In some cases this could be nicely organised and
co-ordinated, in other cases this would be impossible.  Therefore, the object to be evacuated
must reside in a "buffer zone" before the exit point, where it is on hold in order to receive the
authorisation of all intervening parties.  We will refer to this zone as "buffer zone" or "zone
tampon" in French.  The design of the buffer zone should take into account the type of
equipment that will be evacuated through this zone; e.g. large, heavy and radioactive
elements usually come out through BA3.
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Only when all authorisations are received can an object be removed from the buffer zone and
transported to its destination storage area. The storage manager can refuse the evacuation of
the object if no adequate space has been assigned within the proposed storage area.  Except
for conventional waste, which follows an authorised disposal channel through SPL, four
types of temporary storage areas can be distinguished, depending on the nature of the stored
objects:
 Conventional material for future reuse
 Radioactive material for future reuse
 Radioactive waste
 Equipment returned temporarily to a lab or workshop
The application of the general rules and constraints for INB storage areas, especially the
radioactive storage areas, on top of the current implementation at CERN, are not fully
specified yet.  This aspect should be treated as part of the independently funded waste
management system. A clear policy needs to be elaborated concerning the temporary storage
of equipment in a laboratory or workshop – mixing of INB and non-INB equipment must be
avoided and the trace must be maintained by the person responsible for the equipment.
Groups requiring the facility of storing and working on equipment from the INB’s will
therefore have to implement some infrastructure modifications and devote human resources
to traceability activity.
5.9 Resource Estimates
The working group has quantified the resources required:
 Initial Resources needed in order to put the new system in place
 Continuous Resources needed once the new system is in place (during 5 years at
least)
 Financial Resources mainly for hardware equipment
 Human Resources: engineering (Eng.) and technical (Tech.) manpower
There are three areas where the resources are needed for the traceability: Infrastructure,
Development and Execution. The table in Appendix 8.4 gives the details of this analysis.
The table below summarises the estimations for the additional resources needed to implement
a future SPS traceability system as outlined above:
Initial Resources Continuous resources (per year)
Engineer Technician Financial Engineer Technician Financial
4.5 man-year 1.5 man-year 1.4 MCHF 1.5 5 0.1 MCHF
These figures do not take into account the following topics, which need to be evaluated at a
later stage by the competent bodies:
 The detailed study and proposed implementation of the buffer zones
 The possible risk of radioactive contamination and prevention
 The application of the general, non-traceability-specific INB requirements for
storage areas




The LEP dismantling will produce a huge amount of waste, both conventional and nuclear.
The study which was required by the French authorities to obtain permission for dismantling,
lead to the development of an appropriate framework for CERN to manage waste in the
context of INB.
Working on the assumption that all conventional waste is disposed of through external
channels (recycling agencies), all conventional material is managed by its owners
(Accelerator Sector) and that all nuclear material is also managed in the divisions under the
supervision of TIS, the waste problem is mainly a problem of management of nuclear waste.
Nuclear waste is produced by all CERN accelerators, located on French and Swiss territory;
its management involves specific areas for interim storage and treatment and specific disposal
channels. A distinction has to be made between waste produced in Switzerland and France
and between the INB or non INB origin of the waste.
The SPS waste management has therefore to be considered within the framework of the
global CERN approach.
6.2 Global CERN Approach to Nuclear Waste Management
The preliminary recommendations of a (draft) study by TIS concerning radioactive waste
management at CERN are:
1) A professional CERN interim storage facility including a waste processing and clearance
measurement facility should be established.
2) All actions necessary to permit the determination of radionuclide inventories should be
started immediately.
3) Practical and stable channels for disposal of radioactive waste to external depositories and
for clearance of material which is no longer radioactive will be established in agreement
with the authorities of the Host States.
4) A set of clear procedures should be defined for waste transfer within CERN. These will
cater for the management and provision of storage space, ensure traceability, facilitate the
determination of radionuclide inventories and minimise the exposure of staff during
handling.
5) The design of future facilities and installations must include the minimisation of the
radioactive waste that will be produced when the equipment is finally destroyed.
6) Costs for handling, storing and disposal of waste should be borne by the owner of the
equipment and should be included in the overall costs estimate at the design stage
(“polluter pays principle”).
Such an approach implies the allocation of substantial additional financial resources which
will be implemented as a CERN-wide project and which are therefore outside of the scope of
INBOPS.
20
6.3 SPS Waste Management
Definition
Once the zoning of the installation has been established, the SPS INB will, by definition,
produce either:
- conventional waste: coming out of a conventional zone
- nuclear waste: coming out of a nuclear zone.
Nuclear Waste
According to the data recorded by TIS, the average radioactive waste flux coming out of the
SPS INB is estimated to be more than 100 m3 per year (50% of CERN’s total nuclear waste
production); this amount doubled during 2000 and 2001 when the machine underwent
substantial reconstruction in preparation for LHC.
Conventional Waste
The quantity of conventional waste produced each year is not known. All conventional waste
produced by CERN is evacuated, either through the SPL Division or through subcontractors
working for contracts placed by the ST division. The total tonnage which goes through the
SPL division is 3500 tons/year (averaged over the last two years) and this for the whole
CERN. The way the waste is presently collected does not allow precise estimates for the SPS-
INB but is estimated to be of the order of 500 tons per year.
In order to minimise the costs, some constituents of the waste like metallic parts (copper,
iron, aluminium) have to be regrouped in dedicated containers. The major part of the SPS
waste is generated during the annual 4 month shutdown. At present waste coming from areas
other than the tunnel is not checked for radioactivity and it is mixed with other conventional
waste.
It will require one person working full time during the shutdown to ensure the correct
separation of the waste and some extra funding will be required to buy the containers and
provide a suitable space at each of the SPS sites and possibly at a central location as well.
The French authorities require traceability for all conventional waste and the new contract
should make provision for this. The traceability of conventional waste from surface buildings
could be established at the level of recording quantities removed from the CERN site, rather
than from specific locations within the INB perimeter. This would therefore be a simpler and
much cheaper system to implement than that required for the underground areas.
Putting the containers, traceability and new contract in place will take around six man-months
to set up (planning, placing contracts and implementation) and will have to be followed with
a continuing effort of about 1man-month per annum.
The extra resources needed are therefore ~0.5 man-year during each shutdown (should be
outsourced) and an estimated 200 kCHF for containers and space.
6.4 Estimated Resources and Costs
An estimate of the resources and costs for the treatment of the nuclear and conventional
waste coming from the SPS INB has been made; it corresponds to a permanent effort of
2.5 FTE (i.e. 2.5 man-years per year) of which 1 is at engineer level and 1.5 at technician
level, plus a one-off input of 1.5 man-years at engineer level, and a cost of 30 kCHF
according to the following breakdown:
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Waste Management
Choice of materials to be installed in the ring, checks of contracts, careful
management of the beam losses during operation,…[continuous] 1 my
Define and implement new conventional waste management procedures
[prior] 0.5 my
Estimation of annual conventional and nuclear flux [prior] 0.5 my
Waste management at source (checking in the tunnel or in BA’s)
[continuous] 0.5 my
Nuclear waste processing [continuous] 0.5 my
Infrastructure for conventional waste from surface buildings [prior] 200 kCHF
Waste database maintenance cost  [continuous] 30 kCHF
Documentation and report writing:
Annual balance of waste fluxes [continuous] 0.1 my
Waste management procedures [prior] 0.5 my
The infrastructure of interim storage and treatment centre and the management of these




Modifications are required to the infrastructure to accommodate traceability and waste
disposal procedures. The bulk of the infrastructure for traceability has been discussed in
chapter 5 but there was no provision at that stage for the weigh bridge and gate monitor. This
equipment was put in place for LEP Dismantling but there is an on going cost for its
operation – manpower and maintenance. The weigh bridge will require an operator for
working hours and assistance from a radiation technician from time to time.
7.2 Database
It is clear from the work of the zoning sub-group that at least all individual pieces which are
within the nuclear zones of the machine should be identified and their specification should be
available from the database. This information is required for the ultimate disposal and whilst
it is not necessary for the traceability, it is closely related and the database should be built so
that there is a seamless interface with the traceability data. It would be a formidable task to
try and establish this database from the start but it should be possible to build it up over a few
years, ensuring that anything which is moved during a shutdown is identified in this database.
This will consume at least 4 man months of effort at the database end and probably another
man-month per equipment group concerned (searching out specifications and historical
information from the 20 or so groups concerned).
7.3 Planning
There will have to be major changes in the planning activities for each shutdown because
each piece of equipment which will be removed from the tunnel should be specified before
the shutdown. This specification will include the identification and usual description of the
elements but should also include the chemical composition of the element if it is to be
disposed of as waste (for conventional waste to determine its value and for radioactive waste
for its ultimate disposal).
There is a critical lack of storage space at present and this will certainly continue in the
medium term. It is essential that the planning establishes the destination for each element to
be removed from the tunnel and it should be verified that there is space available at the
destination.
7.4 Quality Assurance
The INB Quality Assurance Unit will base its plans on procedures established by the groups
involved in managing the various activities. For example a result oriented contract
concerning traceability should have a number of procedures and checks included and it will
be these procedures which are referred to by the INB quality plan. Groups will therefore have
to devote resources to the creation of their procedures and the follow up during the execution
of the contract. The procedures will have to be documented by the groups and the quality
plan established in conjunction with the unit in ST Division.
23
7.5 Security
SPS sites are relatively open at present and there is no permanent presence. LEP experience
has shown that there is an increasingly significant volume of theft from the sites (particularly
scrap metal like copper and aluminium) and therefore some improved level of site security is
required for the SPS sites. The minimum that one might expect would be to have 24 hour
surveillance by mobile security teams and to improve the perimeter fences. The cost for a
security patrol team will be around 850 kCHF per annum and the modification of the fences
an initial one-off cost of 200 kCHF. Maintenance of the sites and and security facilities and
provision of equipment for the personnel will require an annual materials expenditure of
around 25 kCHF.
7.6 Storage Facilities
During LEP dismantling it was necessary to employ additional personnel for the management
of the storage facilities. This will probably be needed again during the shutdown periods to
handle the increased activities and will correspond to an additional outsourcing of around
1 man-year per year. These facilities also require maintenance and additional hardware like
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8.3 ZONAGE NOTES AND TABLES
Key to abbreviations used in the following tables
C = calculations (Monte Carlo, analytical)
S = radiation surveys (with active instrumentation or passive dosimetry)
M = gamma-spectrometry measurements on samples taken from the area and/or smear tests
H = reconstruction of operation “history” of the area and estimate of beam losses
I = additional instrumentation needed in the tunnel or service areas. Design work required.
L = data logging
Table 1 : Underground Areas of SPS
Area Function Specific hazard Possible classification Needs
TS 1+ / TS 1- Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
LSS1 Straight section 1 Internal dumps MA/HA around dumps,
FA elsewhere
H,S,I,L,C
PP1 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M
TA1 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA C,S,I,M
TS 2+ / TS 2– Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
LSS2 Straight section 2 Extraction elements, separators MA/HA around septa,
FA elsewhere
H,S,I,L,C
PP2 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M
TA2 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA C,S,I,M
TS 3+ / TS 3– Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
LSS3 Straight section 3 RF cavities Mainly TFA, perhaps
some FA
H,S,I,L
PP3 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M
TA3 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA C,S,I,M
TS 4+ / TS 4– Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L






PP4 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M
TA4 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA C,S,I,M
PAM4 Shaft, Material None Conventional/TFA














Piping lines with radioactive air
and cooling water from CNGS +
temporary storage of rad. material
Conventional/TFA H,C,M
TS 5+ / TS 5– Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
LSS5 Straight section 5 None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
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Table 1 (continued)
Area Function Specific hazard Possible classification Needs
PP5 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M







TS 6+ / TS 6– Tunnel ring sextant None TFA/FA H,S,I,L
LSS6 Straight section 6 Extraction elements, separators MA/HA around septa,
FA elsewhere
H,S,I,L,C
PP6 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional C,S,I,M
TA6 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA C,S,I,M
TNC Neutrino cave Neutrino target and beam line MA/HA S,M
PP7 Shaft, Personnel None Conventional/TFA S,I,M
TA7 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA S,M
Bldg. 846 Escape shaft None Conventional to FA S,M
TT 60 Transfer tunnel External dump MA/HA H,S,I,L,C
TCC 6 Target area Target station T1 MA/HA H,S,I,L
TI2 Transfer tunnel Proton injection line SPS-LHC TFA/FA I,L,S,C
PMI2 Shaft None Conventional I,L,S
TI8 Transfer tunnel Proton injection line SPS-LHC TFA/FA I,L,S,C
TJ8/PGC8 Switchyard Back-up dumps TFA/FA I,L,S


















TT 40 Access tunnel to





TDC 2 Tunnel divider cave Splitters MA/HA H,S,I,L
TCC 2 Tunnel target cave Target Stations T2, T4, T6, TAXs MA/HA H,S,I,L
TA801 Access tunnel None Conventional/TFA S,M
GL802 Liaison gallery None Conventional/TFA S,M,
PGT802 Shaft 889/GL802 None Conventional S,M
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Table 2: Surface Areas of SPS
Area Function Specific hazard Possible classification Needs
BA1 (888) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BA2 (869) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BA3 (870) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BA4 (871) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BB4 (921) Auxiliary building
annex
None Conventional S
BA5 (872) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BB5 (899) Auxiliary building
annex
None Conventional S
BA6 (873) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BA7 (876) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
BA80 (889) Auxiliary building Water treatment areas Conventional, TFA in
the ion exchangers
S
898 Ventilation TT20 Air filters Conventional, TFA in
the filters
S
874 PCR None Conventional S
TCC 2 berm Shielding Beam in TCC2 (beam on) TFA S,M
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Table 3: CNGS Areas
Area Function Specific hazard Possible classification Need
TA41 Access tunnel from
ECA4
None Conventional, except
near the target station
where it could be TFA
S,M
TCV4 Ventilation chamber Air and water treatment TFA, but will contain
air filters and rad. water
S,M,C
TSG40 Radioactive storage It will contain storage of
radioactive items
Conventional/TFA S,M
TSG41 Link to target cave Storage of crane cable TFA/FA S,M,C







TSG42-48 Cross-tunnels Stripline, cables, water pipes, etc. FA/MA S,M,C
TT41 Proton beam tunnel Transfer beam line elements TFA/FA to MA close to
the target cave
S,M,C
TCC4 Target cave Target station, horn, reflector MA to HA S,M,C
TND4 Decay tunnel Windows and tunnel pipes MA to HA S,M,C
TNB4 Hadron stopper Graphite and steel stopper MA to HA S,M,C
TNM1 First muon detectors None Conventional but TFA




None Conventional but TFA
where the beam hits.
S,M
TZ80-82 Access connections




Figure 1: Layout of the LHC extraction and CNGS transfer lines.
Figure 2: Layout of CNGS tunnels in the downstream area.
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Table 4: Manpower requirement for the zonage of the underground areas of SPS.
AREA MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING NOTES
H S I L M C H S I L M C
TS 1+ / TS 1- (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS1 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP1 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA1 None (b) (c) None (e)
6
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS1
includes PP1 and TA1
TS 2+ / TS 2– (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS2 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP2 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA2 None (b) (c) None (e)
3
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS2
includes PP2 and TA2
TS 3+ / TS 3– (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS3 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP3 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA3 None (b) (c) None (e)
1
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS3
includes PP3 and TA3
TS 4+ / TS 4– (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS4 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP4 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA4 None (b) (c) None (e)
4
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS4
includes PP4 and TA4
ECX4/ECA4 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 4 (f) (b) (g) (h) (i) None Includes PAM4 / PAP4
TS 5+ / TS 5– (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS5 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP5 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA5 None (b) (c) None (e)
1
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS5
includes PP5 and TA5
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Table 4 (continued).
AREA MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING NOTES
H S I L M C H S I L M C
ECX5/ECA5 (a) (b) (c) (d) None 6 (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
TS 6+ / TS 6– (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
LSS6 (a) (b) (c) (d) None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PP6 None (b) (c) None (e) None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA6 None (b) (c) None (e)
3
None (b) (g) None (i) None
Calculations for LSS6
includes PP6 and TA6
TNC None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
PP7 None (b) (c) None (e) None None (b) (g) None (i) None
TA7 None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
Bldg. 846 None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
TT 60 (a) (b) (c) (d) None 2 (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
TCC 6 (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
TI2 None (b) (c) (d) None 1 None (b) (g) (h) None None TI2/TI8/TT41 done toge-ther, total 3 man-months
PMI2 None (b) (c) (d) None None None (b) (g) (h) None None
TI8 None (b) (c) (d) None 1 None (b) (g) (h) None None TI2/TI8/TT41 done toge-ther, total 3 man-months
TJ8/PGC8 None (b) (c) (d) None 2 None (b) (g) (h) None None Calculations of induced
activity missing
TT 10 (a) (b) (c) (d) None 3 (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
PGC1 None (b) (c) (d) None 3 None (b) (g) (h) None None
TT 20 (a) (b) (c) (d) None 2 (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
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Table 4 (continued).
AREA MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING NOTES
H S I L M C H S I L M C
DP522 None (b) None None (e) 3 None (b) None None (i) None
DP523 None (b) None None (e) None (b) None None (i) None
TT 40 None (b) (c) (d) None 5 None (b) (g) (h) None None
TDC 2 (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
TCC 2 (a) (b) (c) (d) None None (f) (b) (g) (h) None None
TA801 None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
GL802 None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
PGT802 None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
34
Table 5: Manpower requirement for the zonage of the surface areas of SPS.
AREA MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING NOTES
H S I L M C H S I L M C
BA1 (888) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA2 (869) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA3 (870) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA4 (871) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BB4 (921) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA5 (872) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BB5 (899) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA6 (873) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA7 (876) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
BA80 (889) None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
898 None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
874 None (b) None None None None None (b) None None None None
TCC 2 berm None (b) None None (e) None None (b) None None (i) None
Table 6: Total manpower requirement for the zonage of SPS.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING
H S I L M C H S I L M C
TOTAL 6 0 4 6 6 50 1 0 1 1 4 0
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NOTES
(a) Global effort for all areas concerned: 6 man-months.
(b) No additional manpower is estimated necessary with respect to what is presently done by the available staff. Some additional TLD
monitoring will be necessary, but this should not require a large effort. The present manpower involved in the radiation surveys and
monitoring is estimated at 1.5 man-years of technical staff in TIS/RP.
(c) Global effort for all areas concerned: 4 man-months. This is essentially represented by effort to be done by TIS/RP to review existing
installation of beam loss monitors (BLM) and induced activity monitors (PMI), to specify additional instrumentation which may be needed
and to implement it.
(d) Global effort for all areas concerned: 6 man-months.
(e) Global effort for all areas concerned: 6 man-months. Collection of samples, reduction to form suitable for gamma spectrometry, gamma-
spectrometry measurements and data analysis.
(f) Global effort for all areas concerned (including CNGS): 1 man-months. Collecting information and updating documentation.
(g) Global effort for all areas concerned: 1 man-months. Follow-up of upgraded instrumentation.
(h) Global effort for all areas concerned: 1 man-months. Essentially data analysis.
(i) Global effort for all areas concerned: 4 man-months.
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Table 7: Manpower requirement for the zonage of CNGS.
AREA MANPOWER REQUIREMENT (MAN-MONTHS)
PRIOR CONTINUING NOTES
H S I L M C H S I L M C
TA41 None (a) None None (b) None None (a) None None (d) None
TCV4 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TSG40 None (a) None None (b) None None (a) None None (d) None
TSG41 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TSG4 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TSG42-48 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TT41 None (a) None None (b) 1 None (a) None None (d) None TI2/TI8/TT41 done toge-ther, total 3 man-months
TCC4 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TND4 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TNB4 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TNM1 None (a) None None (b) (c) None (a) None None (d) None
TNM2 None (a) None None (b) None None (a) None None (d) None
TZ80-82 None (a) None None (b) None None (a) None None (d) None
Total for CNGS areas
TOTAL 0 6 0 0 3 1 0 6 0 0 6 0
NOTES
(a) Global effort for all areas concerned (prior + continuing): 6 man-months.
(b) Global effort for all areas concerned: 3 man-months.
(c) Calculations for all areas are under way and will be finished by the end of the year. Global effort = 3 man-years.
(d) Global effort (including measurements of water releases and on rock samples) for all areas concerned: 6 man-months.
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Infrastructure Man-month kCHF Man-month/year kCHF/year
Eng. Tech Eng. Tech.
Kiosks 3 3 100 - 2 25 At all 12 Exit Points
Conception and
installation








2 200(**) - 24 25 Storage Managers
Containers - - 25 - - 25 For small objects
Developments Man-month kCHF Man-month/year kCHF/year
Eng Tech Eng Tech
Interface 24 - - 5 - - Standardised for Office
and Kiosk
Execution Man-month kCHF Man-Month/year kCHF/year







- - Training Information









- Mainly for shutdown in
each of ~10 groups
Follow-up
central
- - 2 - - "Service après-vente"
Note that the installation work for the buffer zones (*) takes up most of the financial resources.
Since this covers mainly civil engineering work, the actual estimation of 1 million Swiss francs
might be optimistic.  The estimation for the modifications to the radioactive storage areas (**)
depends on the general requirements for INB and does not take into account the construction of
additional buildings.  Equally outside this scope is the creation of a radioactive workshop for the
treatment of radioactive waste, which must be a serious consideration.
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sûreté du LHC (départ:
rapport préliminaire) 
Document de synthèse sur
la gestion des déchets
Figure 4. Documents to present to DSIN in the coming 3 years - agreed with DSIN November 2000 
Comments of "GP labos et usines"  on 
preliminary LHC report including SPS and 
CNGS which includes mods after DES etc.
LHC complements, but also SPS 
and CNGS complements  to DSIN 
(based on DES comments)
Rapport provisoire de 
sûreté (LHC, SPS, 
CNGS)
LEP dismantling finished Waste study of the whole installation to be done before end 2004 (SPS + LHC); June 2001 - not started
June 2001:
       Partially done-(LHC+CNGS)








Draft sent to 
DSIN 
DES comments on 
LHC preliminary due 
(waiting June 2001)
